DID IMPENDING WAR IN EUROPE HELP DESTROY THE GOLD BLOC IN 1936? AN INTERNAL INCONSISTENCY HYPOTHISIS
We suggest a reinterpretation of the forces that forced France off the gold standard in September 1936. Rather than originating in the purely economic sphere we argue that the reemergence of Germany as a military power is also a likely cause. While it is true that France in the mid-1930s faced a contradiction between reflation of the economy through monetary expansion (to create jobs) and continued adherence to the gold standard; likewise there was a contradiction between increased spending on rearmament (to maintain national security) and maintenance of the gold standard. Moreover, shocks to confidence in a monetary system may originate from outside the purely economic sphere, especially when war with a larger neighbor is in prospect. Indeed, referring to the breakdown of the classical gold standard a generation earlier, Brown (1940) wrote: "During the late spring and early summer of 1914 the shadow of the approaching conflict in Europe was cast over the world's money markets" (page7). And in the period in which we are interested an authority on the history of interest rates writes "throughout the 1930's France struggled unsuccessfully to defend the franc in the face of world-wide depression and the looming prospect of war" (Homer, 1963, page 431. Italics added) . We contend that it is legitimate therefore to reopen enquiry into the question of what destroyed the gold bloc -the last vestige of the international gold standard -three years before the outbreak of World War II. In particular, was it only economic forces, or, did the specter of war in Europe play an accompanying role?
In 1925 the international gold standard was reconstituted with its previous major players rejoining. As various investigations have shown, it was destroyed in both the UK and the USA by adverse economic and financial circumstances stemming from the Great Depression, and this is also true of Germany (Eichengreen, 1992 , Hallwood, MacDonald and Marsh, 1996 , 1997 . As the fourth great player, France, abandoned the gold standard in September 1936, only three-and-one-half years after the USA, earlier investigations of this event have also focused on economic causes (Eichengreen, 1992 , Hogg, 1987 1 . However, we believe that a narrow economic approach to the French suspension misses some important causes as it does not take into account the concurrent transformation of the European military-political order which was hugely to the disadvantage of France.
In this paper we distinguish between the 'external' and the 'internal' inconsistency of the gold bloc regime. 2 Previous economic analyses of the collapse of the gold bloc has emphasised its external inconsistency. That is, continued adherence to gold rendered the gold bloc countries uncompetitive, with worsening current accounts and falling gold reserves, ultimately they broke under the tension and abandoned gold (see for example, Hautcoeur, 1997) . 3 The internal inconsistency argument presented here is that there was an asymmetric threat from the reemergence of Germany as a military force, and this adversely impacted France more than it did the other gold bloc members. On this assumption, the 1 Hogg (1987) concluded: "Having decided to stick to gold, the bourgeois governments of the four countries studied here at the same time refused to face the logical alternative -deflation. This was primarily due to the political factors…in general there was not actual money deflation…Opposition to the continuation of the current parity usually came from isolated academics and sometimes export groups"(Page 208). 2 The four main members of the gold bloc were Belgium, France, Netherlands and Switzerland. Other original members, Italy, Poland, Danzig and Czechoslovakia all soon moved to foreign exchange controls.
3 Beaudry and Portier (2002) , argue that over-valuation of the French franc was not a major factor causing the Great Depression in France because international trade was too small a percentage of GDP (page 86).
gold bloc broke under the strain of gold losses from France, in some measure to other gold bloc countries. Ultimately the French could not sustain these gold losses and abandoned gold. The remaining countries, Switzerland and Netherlands simply followed suit after the bloc's major player had abandoned gold.
We proceed as follows: Section 1 sets out the international military-political context in which the franc was devalued. Section 2 discusses the economic context. Section 3 extends the discussion of the economic context with a statistical investigation of the internal consistency of the gold-bloc's exchange rate regime. We find that exchange rate commitments between the members were not viewed in financial markets as being consistent with one another -implying that the gold bloc was not a credible target zone. An implication of this is that asymmetric shocks stemming from the military-political context were all the more potent. Section 4 discusses how short-and long-term interest rate behavior in the gold bloc-four relates to our thesis of asymmetric military-political shocks playing a role in its destruction. We find some support for the notion that France's commitment to gold was adversely affected by Italy's invasion of Abyssinia, as well as Germany's reoccupation of the Rhineland. Section 5 examines post-gold bloc capital flows. It is pointed out that capital that had left Netherlands and Switzerland in the run up to their abandonment of gold, returned to these countries during 1937 -as it had to Belgium following its devaluation in March-April 1935. However, neither foreign capital nor French capital returned to France during the same year. This set of observations is consistent with the asymmetric military-political shock hypothesis: in financial markets German remilitarization was seen as more of a problem for France than for the other gold bloc members. Section 6 concludes.
Section 1: The international military-political context
The Treaty of Versailles ending the First World War fell far short of satisfying France's national security needs (Kissinger, 1994 (Kissinger, 1994, p 253 League of Nations as a potential force in halting aggression" (Shirer, 1969, p. 250 foreigners in the US amounted to $1,460,000,000, an increase of nearly $1,000,000,000 since the end of 1933. … French, Dutch and Swiss balances on September 30 th , 1936, totaled $390,000,000, the bulk of which was acquired since the end of 1933. This inward movement of funds was associated to an important degree with financial crises in the gold-bloc countries, though also influenced to some extent by the unsettled international situation in Europe. While readjustment of currencies has been followed by some return of hoarded funds and capital from London, uncertainties abroad continue and gold-bloc balances in the US have been little reduced since September" (Federal Reserve Bulletin, December 1936, page 938) .
Paul Einzig (1937) reports a run on the banks in north and north eastern France in March 1936 so linking financial disturbances in France to German military events. Einzig also reports wealthy French streaming across the English Channel to London carrying currency and gold for deposit in British banks which were so swamped that they ran out of safe deposit boxes.
It is possible to argue therefore that military-political developments in Germany and Italy, combined with diplomatic failures to combat them, undermined the confidence of the French not so much in the franc as in the survival of France itself. This is especially so as surely more people than just Pierre Flandin, the Foreign Minister in March 1936, had the prescience to think that "once Germany had fortified the Rhineland, Czechoslovakia would be lost and that, soon after, general war would become unavoidable" (quoted by Kissinger, 1994 , page 305).
Military developments in Germany also had clear budgetary implications in France. Einzig (1937) suggests that the French government refused to finance a general mobilization called for by the French military because of its cost. The implication for the budget deficit of the Rhineland reoccupation surely could not have been lost on those people holding liquid capital, for shortly after the new government came to power military spending was indeed increased -by F14 billion (a figure equal to about one-quarter of French gold reserves). there is a clear inconsistency between crumbling confidence in national security and a strong franc. This inconsistency should be set side-by-side with the oft stated inconsistency between reflation, say, on the lines of the American New Deal, and a strong franc -an argument to which we now turn.
Section 2: Economic factors
We favor understanding the international gold standard in terms of the monetary approach to the balance of payments (see, e.g., Eichengreen, and Flandreau, 1996 , McCloskey and Zecher, 1976 , Dornbusch, 1973 , or Johnson and Frenkel, 1976 ). This analysis is implicit in Eichengreen's (1992) authoritative economic study of the gold bloc. In this view monetary dis-hoarding and balance and payments deficits are occasioned by excessive rates of domestic credit expansion. The main problem for the French following the devaluations of the pound and dollar in, respectively, September 1931 and March 1933, was that higher prices in the sterling and dollar areas encouraged hoarding in these which, evidently, was not matched by sufficient domestic credit expansion as gold flowed to them through balance of payments surpluses from the gold bloc countries.
As the gold bloc countries had ruled out foreign exchange controls, payments equilibrium could be restored only under one (or a combination) of two circumstances. Either their price levels had to fall sufficiently to cheapen their exports so much as to end the desire to hoard in the sterling and dollar areas; or the gold bloc countries ended the international price level disparity by themselves devaluing -so ending their desire to dis-hoard. However, all leading political parties in France were set against devaluation -mainly because of the fear that it would lead to a repeat of the inflation suffered in the 1920s.
Unfortunately, the process of price-deflation in the gold bloc-four was drawn out and at a huge cost in terms of unemployment. With French public wearied of the Depression but still set against devaluation they increasingly turned to the Popular Front which stood for the contradictory policy of reflation without devaluation (Eichengreen, 1992) . With unemployment so high one may wonder why the French public was so resolved against devaluation. Shepherd explains that "in continental Europe, the distinction is seldom drawn in the popular mind between devaluation and inflation" (1936, page 199 should be noted, the supposed effects of the Popular Front are confounded with the asymmetric military-political shock hypothesis put forward here.
Section III: Exchange Rate Behavior
We begin our analysis of the gold bloc and its collapse with a consideration of how soundly the four members were viewed in financial markets as being wedded to the gold standard. If a country is thought by financial markets to be securely tied to gold its exchange rate should be mean reverting (Krugman, 1991, Bertola and Svensson, 1993) .
That is, if an exchange rate is near either of the gold points, especially the gold export point where the currency is weak, it should tend to revert toward the center of the band, rather than to bump along one of its edges. To test for mean reversion of gold bloc exchange rates we use the variance ratio test, originally proposed in the economics literature by Cochrane (1988) and previously used to test for mean reversion of exchange rates under the classical gold standard by Hallwood, MacDonald and Marsh, 1996. 12 The variance ratio test is potentially a powerful way of testing for the univariate meanreverting properties of a series because it can capture potential long autocorrelations which are unlikely to be captured in standard Dickey Fuller type tests, and which can be important in producing mean reversion. Under the null hypothesis that a variable, such as the exchange rate, follows a random walk, the variance of the kth difference should equal k times the first difference. That is, where V k denotes the variance ratio, based on lag k. So a finding that an estimated value of V k equals unity would imply that the exchange rate follows a random walk. However, if V k turns out to be less than unity this would imply that the exchange rate was stationary and mean-reverting. The intuition for this is straightforward -if the underlying process driving the real exchange rate is mean-reverting, the variance of the series would decrease as k becomes larger. Alternatively, if V k turns out to be greater than one, the exchange rate would exhibit 'super-persistence'
For the Classical and inter-war gold standard periods, exchange rates do appear to be strongly mean-reverting, thereby supporting the view that these gold standard episodes were credible (see, for example, Hallwood MacDonald and Marsh (1996) and secure on gold.
The results of our variance ratio test for the gold bloc period are reported in Table 1 , for lag lengths k=2 through to K =30. In sum, and in contrast to the results reported for other gold standard periods, the results here show no sign of exchange rate mean reversion for any of the four currencies against each other. The results are read in the following way.
For each currency we present two variants of the variance ratio test -V1 and V2. The former is calculated using a small sample correction, which is likely to be important in the current application, whereas the latter is not. The column headings K=2 to K=30
denote the lag lengths (number of months) used to calculate the variance ratio test.
Numbers in parenthesis denote the standard error. The results are unambiguous since all apart from one cell entry (V2 and K=30 for the Belgian franc) exhibit super persistence and an absence of mean reversion. As we have said these results are very different to other gold standard experiences and we conclude from this that Wright, 2000) . Numbers in parenthesis are heteroscedasticty robust p-values. the gold bloc was never securely based on gold. It was, therefore, vulnerable to both external inconsistency of price levels with its trade partners/rivals and to asymmetric military-political shocks originating in Germany and Italy. That is, this analysis supports both the external inconsistency argument of, inter alia, Eichengreen (1992) , and our internal inconsistency hypothesis. Interestingly, Ritschl and Wolf (2003) throw some light as to why gold bloc countries' cross exchange rates were not strongly mean reverting. Their evidence is that the gold bloc members were not particularly well tradeintegrated with each other. Specifically, that 1928 trade patterns did not 'predict' membership of the gold bloc, while they did so for the Reichsmark bloc and the sterling bloc which were both formed after sterling was knocked off gold in September 1931. We move on to see whether internal inconsistency was indeed a factor in causing the collapse of the gold bloc.
Section 4: Interest rates
We use Switzerland as a 'base' country as it was much less likely to become embroiled in a new world war than was France. Indeed, "Switzerland enjoyed unusual political and economic stability for almost a century and a half. Beleaguered but untouched by two world wars, the small nation became a symbol of neutrality and a safe haven for refugee capital" (Homer, 1963, page 470) . Thus, we assume that changes in French interest rates relative to Swiss rates captures at least some of the asymmetric shock of German remilitarization on the internal coherence of the gold bloc Using 12 month moving averages it cannot be said for the period 1928(11) to 1936(12) that there is a "normal" level of short-French interest rates -at least as measured by the available data, which is for private discount rates. 13 They were high at the beginning of the period, reflecting French franc weakness soon after (de facto) rejoining the gold standard -something that is supported by the revelation of strong devaluation expectations against the French franc held in foreign exchange markets as shown in Hallwood, MacDonald and Marsh (1996) . French interest rates fell back in the middle months of our data period as foreign exchange speculation moved first against the pound sterling -pushing it off gold in September 1931 -followed by speculation against the US dollar, which fell in March 1933 (see Marsh, 1997, 2000) .
However, French short-term interest rates climbed sharply from spring 1935 -concurre nt with the Belgian banking crisis and the severely deteriorating international political situation discussed above. They remained high thereafter.
To pick out the effect of military-political events on the internal consistency of the gold bloc we turn to a discussion of: One way to indicate the effect of German remilitarization on the internal consistency of the gold bloc is to compare French and Swiss interest rate gaps (long-minus shortrates) 16 . A rise in the short-term interest rate relative to the long rate is often taken as a sign of economic and/or financial weakness (Mishkin, 1995, and references there in, Dotsey, 1998) . Under a pegged exchange rate regime such as the gold standard, a rise in short-term interest rates indicates a lack of trust in the stability of the value in foreign currency of short-dated securities. Lower interest rates on long-term securi ties, or, at least a rise in short rates relative to long rates, may indicate the expectation of a long-term 16 French yield curve: 3% irredeemable government bonds minus one month private discount rate. Swiss yield curve: 3.5% federal and state railway bonds less one month private discount rate. Source: League of Nations, various issues.
weakening in the real economy. Mishkin (1995, page 16) , using data for five countries, 17 finds positive relationships between changes in the yield curve and future rates of real economic activity. That is, a steeper yield curve is associated with increased levels of economic activity, and a flattening of it with reduced activity. In particular, a yield curve flattening may occur with a combination of a rise in short-term interest rates and a negative shock to expected real economic activity. 18 We argue that military-political shocks (emanating from Germany) on France would indeed cause short-term interest rates to rise relative to long-rates. In 1936 French short-term interest rates did rise -to stem a capital outflow, while it is arguable that prospects for the French real economy would also have been adversely affected.
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Figure 2: French minus Swiss monthly short-and long-term interest rate differentials
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1928(5) to 1936(12)
The yield gap picture is similar when comparing France and the Netherlands. Thus, The shorter period for Dutch data compared with that of France or Switzerland is due to the Netherland Bank temporarily publishing relevant interest rate data quarterly rather than monthly in the middle of our data period. The French interest rate data is as defined above. That of the Netherlands is the private discount rate as proxying for Dutch short-term interest rates, and government 2.5%-3% irredeemable bonds for long-rates. 21 Following the devaluation of the Swiss Franc on 27 th September 1936, the Swiss National Bank reported that "large amounts of Swiss and foreign gold coins…, as well as gold bullion reappeared at the window of the Bank" (Annual Report, 1936 , page 321 in Federal Reserve Bulletin, April 1937 . 22 The six main holders of gold at end-1937 with 82 percent of the world's monetary gold stock were the US, the UK, France, Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium (Netherland Bank, page 659). 23 Page numbers in this paragraph are those in Federal Reserve Bulletin, August 1938. threatening both exchange rate and price level stability, that the Swiss National Bank established a "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Swiss banks to reduce the "excessive volume of foreign deposits held by the banks in Swiss currency" (Swiss National Bank, Annual Report). 24 As to France, the Netherland Bank Annual Report, 1937-38, said that "permanent restoration of confidence in the financial and monetary position of France, with a consequent repatriation of French capital and a return flow of gold to France" was yet to occur (page 659).
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Section 6: Conclusions
We distinguish two different causes of the abandonment of gold by the gold bloc members (France, Netherlands and Switzerland) in September 1936 -the external and internal inconsistency hypotheses. The external inconsistency hypothesis, extant in the literature, takes the form of an argument that economic causes -high price levels in the gold bloc relative to non-gold bloc countries (such as the US and the UK) exerted deflationary pressures in the gold bloc that eventually became intolerable. In this paper we have put forward an alternative internal inconsistency hypothesis -that the gold bloc became unworkable because of asymmetric military-political shocks emanating from Germany and Italy adversely affecting confidence in the French franc to a greater extent than either the Swiss franc or the Dutch gilder.
We find some support for this internal inconsistency hypothesis. In particular we show variance ratio test, indicating a lack of mean reversion in gold bloc currenciessomething that is inconsistent with systems of pegged exchange rates that are thought in financial markets to be secure, lends support to both hypotheses. Thus, we conclude that the internal and external inconsistency hypotheses are complementary, and that it would be wrong to argue for either one excluding the other.
